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Question
What is the evidence on criminal deforestation activity in Latin America (particularly, but not
exclusively the Amazon)?
What lessons have been learned in combatting criminal deforestation activity?
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The K4D helpdesk service provides brief summaries of current research, evidence, and lessons
learned. Helpdesk reports are not rigorous or systematic reviews; they are intended to provide an
introduction to the most important evidence related to a research question. They draw on a rapid
desk-based review of published literature and consultation with subject specialists.
Helpdesk reports are commissioned by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office and
other Government departments, but the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect
those of FCDO, the UK Government, K4D or any other contributing organisation. For further
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1. Summary
This review focuses on Brazil as representative of the overwhelming majority of literature on
criminal activity in relation to deforestation in the Amazon. 64 percent of the Amazon basin is in
Brazil. Peru holds the second largest proportion at only 10 percent. Illegal deforestation occurs
largely through criminal networks as they have the capacity for coordination, processing,
selling, and the deployment of armed men to protect operations. It is estimated to be five to ten
times more profitable than legal operations (Nelleman, 2012). Large networks have the capacity
required for investment in equipment and workers. It is estimated that a small proportion of
properties are responsible for the majority of illegal deforestation (Rajão et al., 2020).
Illegal logging can be conducted in a number of ways including forgery of permits,
logging outside of allowances, laundering illegal timber, and mixing legal with illegal
timber during transportation or in sawmills.
Monitoring and law enforcement are essential for reducing deforestation. Estimates
suggest that almost half of illegal deforestation goes undetected. Loggers use tactics such as
cutting only the most valuable timber to open small clearings that are difficult to detect, cutting
timber out slowly, and operating when satellite views are obscured (at night or in the rainy
season). The System for Real-time Detection of Deforestation (DETER) is the main
environmental monitoring tool in the Amazon but it is limited in technical capacity for
measuring small clearings. DETER-B is able to identify smaller areas but has a slower
response time where timeliness is very important. Satellite systems need to revisit cleared areas
to monitor forest regeneration.
Bribery, corruption and fraud are deeply ingrained in deforestation. Networks may bribe
geoprocessing experts, police and public officials. Members of the criminal groups may
become council members, mayors, and state representatives. Land titles are fabricated and
trading documentation fraudulent.
National systems for registry and monitoring are the most advanced in the region but
have limitations. The online rural property registry system for example, is based on unverified
self-declared information. There is scope for better integrating different systems. Permits for
timber and forest products are easy to falsify and circumvent. Estimates using data from these
systems include: up to 84 percent of deforestation is illegal, 45 percent of registered
properties are non-compliant with the Forest Code, 48 percent of slaughtered cattle are
associated with illegal deforestation, 20 percent of soy exported to the EU is from illegally
deforested land, and more than half of cattle slaughtered are unregistered.
Legal enforcement for compliance of environmental law is weak. Fines can be appealed
indefinitely or simply go uncollected. Increased capacity for fine collection is needed with
adequate funding and training for human resources. One policy found to be particularly
successful was a resolution from the Brazilian Bank in 2008 which meant those with
unpaid fines could not access finance for their businesses. This was more effective than
fines alone which can be repeatedly appealed or go unpaid without consequence. Land
regularisation needs to be promoted to stop land grabbing. Governance measures vary with
election cycles and there is a tendency to relax environmental regulations prior to major
elections.
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Violence and threats are common with 300 deaths reported to have occurred due to land use
conflicts in the last five years. To prevent agency enforcement there has been bridges burned,
fuel truck helicopters destroyed, vehicles set on fire, and trees felled over roads. There is
systematic failure to investigate and prosecute threats and experienced violence. There is
potential discrimination against indigenous groups, and criminal organisations may hold political
power. Brazil does have a Program to Protect Defenders of Human Rights, Journalists, and
Environmentalists which is of some benefit but needs to be improved.
Indigenous people and local communities have an important role to play in identifying logging
which is avoiding satellite detection in the Brazilian Amazon. Where there is lack of resources
and staffing for official enforcement agencies indigenous patrol groups may be effective and
should be supported with equipment and training.
It was beyond the scope of this report to detail the international certification schemes and
programmes which have evolved to reduce illegal logging. These schemes include voluntary
trade agreements such as the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)
Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), or Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification
(Nellemann, 2012). They have been useful in bringing stakeholders together and generating
incentives for legal exports and more sustainable forestry.
Trade agreements to prevent purchasers buying soy and cattle from illegally deforested
areas are subject to laundering and leakage. Importers must make increased efforts to
ensure that timber, cattle, meat, or agricultural products purchased in Brazil did not originate in
illegally deforested or illegally occupied areas in the Amazon. Increased transparency is
required in global supply chains with better labelling.
International investment is another important area of influence with both national and
international institutions having a role to play. An assessment of Dutch financial institutions
found the majority of banks, over half of insurance companies, and all pension funds to
have some connection with illegal deforestation. International investors have a role to play in
holding Amazonian countries to account.
The International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime1 (ICCWC), a collaboration of five
intergovernmental organisations to support wildlife law enforcement exists as a coordinated
support mechanism for addressing money laundering and law enforcement.
Based on experience in Brazil, a number of lessons for combatting illegal deforestation and
related activities emerge:
•
•
•

1
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Surveillance technology could be improved. Indigenous communities should be involved
and supported in deforestation surveillance.
The will and capacity for law enforcement in Brazil is weak and needs to be transformed.
Human resource investment is a priority.
Systems could be tightened and more integrated to reduce corruption and fraudulent
behaviour.

https://cites.org/eng/prog/iccwc_new.php Accessed 7.12.20

•
•
•

International agreements (both trade and otherwise) can support enforcement,
accountability, and transparency.
Greater attention should be paid to the role financial institutions in funding criminal
networks.
Consumer information should be improved on both financial institutions and products
associated with illegal deforestation (beef and soy) so that ethical decisions can be
made.

2. Introduction
The rapid evidence search for this review produced a vast majority of literature of relevance to
the question on the Brazilian Amazon. Table 1 shows that 64 percent of the Amazon basin lies
within Brazil. The majority of the scope of this report was taken up with presenting the body of
work on Brazil and constitutes the remainder of the report is information on Brazil. Further
resources are required to investigate these issues for other countries within the Amazon and in
other forested areas in the world. It would be worth investigating how deforestation is addressed
in countries with different governance.
See: Table 1. Land area in countries of the Amazon basin,
https://globalforestatlas.yale.edu/region/amazon Accessed 30.11.20
The general trend since 2012 has been an increase in the forest clearing rate in the Brazilian
Amazon (Carvalho et al., 2019). Estimates from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research
suggest forest clearing between August 2019 to July 2020 to have increased by 28 percent
compared with the same time period the previous year (Escobar, 2020). Between 2005 and 2012
there had been a decline. Fearnside (2012) cautions against attributing this trend to control
measures as the decline correlates with fall in commodity prices.
One of the global concerns for deforestation is the impact on climate change. Estimates in 2004
found forest loss to have contributed to around 70 percent of Brazils greenhouse gas emissions
(Assunção & Gandour, 2019).
A Climate Policy Initiative paper highlights that forest protection is not just important for
environmental protection but also important for Brazil’s international reputation as the country
builds its position in global markets (Assunção & Gandour, 2019). Environmental protection also
has economic implications as agricultural production is dependent on biophysical factors such as
the preservation of water resources which is linked to vegetation and ecosystem conservation.
The change in political leadership in Brazil in 2018 has caused concern for environmental goals.
The current president is unsupportive of environmental protection and illegal deforestation is
thought to have worsened as criminals believe their activities are more likely to be overlooked
(Acebes et al., 2019). “Crime groups involved in illegal deforestation have taken President
Bolsonaro’s statements and policies weakening environmental law enforcement as a green light
to destroy the forest and attack forest defenders, several officials told Human Rights Watch”
(p131-132).
“In many cases, suitable technologies and systems already exist to better control adherence to
the terms of deforestation agreements and legislation, and what is lacking is political will to make
full use of these tools.” (Carvalho et al., 2019, p126).
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3. Criminal involvement in deforestation
Nelleman (2012) estimates illegal timber trade to be five to ten times more profitable than legal
operations. Crime and corruption are deeply ingrained (Assunção & Gandour, 2019). Illegal
deforestation occurs largely through criminal networks as the large-scale extraction process
requires logistical capacity for coordination, processing, selling, and in the deployment of armed
men to protect operations (Acebes et al., 2019). Large networks have the capital to buy heavy
equipment and hire workers. The ipê is the most valuable tree and fetches between US$500$1,500 per trunk. Once the valuable wood has been removed undetected, the networks cut and
set fire to the remaining vegetation opening land for other uses such as cattle rearing (60
percent) and crop farming (6 percent) (Acebes et al., 2019).
Rajão et al (2020) find most of Brazil’s agricultural output to be unconnected to deforestation and
that only “2% of properties in the Amazon and Cerrado are responsible for 62% of all
potentially illegal deforestation and that roughly 20% of soy exports and at least 17% of beef
exports from both biomes to the EU may be contaminated with illegal deforestation” (p246).
Nellemann (2012) lists more than 30 ways of conducting illegal logging, laundering, and
selling illegal logs. These include forging logging permits, bribing to obtain logging permits,
logging outside of allowances, hacking government websites to obtain transport permits for
higher volumes, laundering illegal timber, and mixing legal timber during transport or in mills.
Laundering operations are becoming increasingly advanced and difficult to detect. Many illegal
operations involve bribing forest officials, police, military, and sometimes village heads.
Mining is also connected to deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon but is less prominent in the
literature. Illegal mining involves criminal activities similar to logging (Perazzoni, 2018). Activities
include fraud in acquiring permits or extraction without a permit, using authorisations for one area
to legalise extraction from illegal areas, falsifying documentation with regard to quantity
allowances, and corruption of National Department of Mineral Production.

4. Surveillance
Monitoring is essential for reducing deforestation (along with law enforcement) (Assunção &
Gandour, 2019). Estimates between 2008 and 2013 suggest that only 55 percent of illegal
deforestation was detected and that technological instruments are insufficient to capture
data in time to act (Schmitt, 2015).
To evade surveillance loggers increasingly use tactics such as cutting only the most valuable
timber to open small clearings and leaving vegetation so clearance is difficult to detect on
satellite images. These small clearings accounted for one quarter of deforestation in Brazil in
2002 rising to more than a half in 2012 (Assunção & Gandour, 2019). Other tactics are to build
camps hidden under trees and bring cut timber out slowly rather than accumulating large
quantities in sawmills. Perpetrators also may operate at night or in the rainy season when cloud
cover obscures the view of the satellite (Boekhout van Solinge, 2018).
A study of the Southern Amazonas Mesoregion used geointelligence techniques for comparing
multitemporal satellite sensor images and official data on deforestation and identified a
number of inconsistencies (Perazzoni, 2020). These included between transport times and
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prices reported, volumetric information which did not match forest inventories, exploitation
outside of authorised limits, and exploitation both before licensing was obtained and after
licensing had expired.
Satellite imaging monitoring recent changes in forest cover was developed by the National
Institute for Space Research (Inpe), known as the System for Real-time Detection of
Deforestation (DETER) (Assunção & Gandour, 2019). It is the main environmental monitoring tool
in the Amazon. Daily images are compared and changes are identified with a georeferenced alert
which is passed on to the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural

Resources (IBAMA). It is limited in technical capacity and cannot detect forest loss in areas
covering less than 25 hectares. Small-scale clearings have increased since. DETER-B was
developed which has the advantage of identifying small areas but has a slower time response.

Recommendations
Improvements in technology to detect small-scale clearing in real-time are needed (Acebes
et al., 2019; Carvalho et al., 2019). The current satellite system does not revisit cleared areas so
secondary vegetation is not monitored which makes regeneration vulnerable (Acebes et al.,
2019). An estimated 17 million hectares of secondary vegetation was identified in the Amazon in
2014 equivalent to nearly a quarter of all deforested land suggesting a large amount of cleared
land is abandoned. Forest regeneration is in the Forest Code and the goals set out in the Paris
Agreement. Technology such as electronic cattle-identification may also be considered to
improve tracking of cattle reared on different pieces of land (Carvalho et al., 2019).

5. Bribery, corruption, and fraud
The criminal networks may keep the deforested lands and fabricate titles with the names of
frontmen which requires geoprocessing experts to forge surveys (Acebes et al., 2019). Police
and public officials may be bribed. Members of the criminal groups may become council
members, mayors, and state representatives. Logs get passed as legal with fraudulent
documentation for example, overestimating the volume of timber in a legally logged area and
adding to that stock. Cattle raised illegally “escape controls by either selling it to clandestine
slaughterhouses, passing it for cattle raised in legal ranches, or selling it to cattle ranchers who
specialize in cattle fattening and who in turn sell it to legal slaughterhouses” (Acebes et al., 2019,
p36).
Scope for falsifying required documentation (Carvalho et al., 2019) and evidence on the extent of
these activities is described in the next section.

6. National systems and policies
Systems
Brazil has an online environmental registry system Cadastro Ambiental Rural (CAR) which,
along with its Forest Code, monitors compliance of rural properties. A number of areas are
established areas of permanent protection (APP). According to Rajão et al (2020) these systems
make Brazil stand apart from other countries. However, there are issues with CAR as it is based
on unverified self-declared information (Carvalho et al., 2019).
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The CAR registry system should be used along with mapping and monitoring programmes, and
animal tracking systems for a national and public monitoring system to enforce environmental
compliance (Rajão et al., 2020). Rather than costly private certification systems that lack
transparency and include only specific farms, CAR needs to be integrated with the Animal
Transit Permit, the legally required hygiene check (Carvalho et al., 2019). Measures are needed
to prevent documents being falsified.
Timber and forest products are controlled through a computerised system which issues a
‘Forest Origin Document’ (FOD) after approval of a ‘Sustainable Forest Management Plan’
(Carvalho et al., 2019). The FOD is a compulsory licence to control the transport of forest product
which can be circumvented in a number of ways. Permit holders can overestimate the amount
of timber extracted from approved areas to cover extraction from illegal areas. Fake timber
merchants are created which simulate legal movement of timber. Logging licences can
overestimate the commercial value of timber within that area and so cover for timber extracted
from illegal areas. Surveys show discrepancies between species approved for extraction
and volumes present (Brancalion et al., 2018). Sustainable Forest Management plans have
loopholes which allow the complete harvesting of an area in the first year of a 30-year plan
meant for staggered harvesting (Carvalho et al., 2019).
The database for mining activity, Cadastro Mineiro, records authorised locations, types of
activities, and the valid dates of permits (Perazzoni, 2018). A complementary geographic
information system identifies the location and dimensions of the estate authorised. The system
has been useful in its abilities to verify permits and whether physical limits are being respected.

Evidence
A study links illegal deforestation on individual properties to their agricultural production and
exports to Europe (Rajão et al., 2020). A large sample of CAR properties found 45 percent to be
non-compliant either with the Forest Code for protecting APPs or failing to conserve minimum
legal-reserve areas. 15 percent of the sample were deforested since 2008, with 84 percent of
the deforestations in the Amazon illegal. 50 percent of properties growing soy were
deforested illegally although there is a soy moratorium that prevents the trading of soy grown on
deforested lands in this biome. 18-22 percent of the soy exported to the EU is potentially
contaminated. Around 48 percent of cattle slaughtered may have been reared at some point in
illegal deforested land.
The Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (TAC) agreement commits signatories to refuse
cattle from suppliers using illegally deforested properties, those who were under embargo,
or who did not meet environmental and social criteria. The G4 agreement excludes cattle from
any deforested property, whether the deforestation had been legal or illegal. Klinger et al (2017)
uses cattle vaccination data to assess agreement compliance by slaughterhouses in the state of
Para between 2010 and 2014. The authors note “both the cattle agreements and the soybean
moratorium focused on leveraging commodity purchasers’ influences over farm or ranch-level
producers” (p35). More than half of a sample of cattle from Novo Progresso were
vaccinated in protected areas or were not registered. Qualitative research finds an inability
or lack of will for ranchers to track cattle before their sale to a slaughterhouse. Animals
were often raised on areas out of compliance and then sold to an intermediary. The researchers
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found inaccurate registration and weak tracing mechanisms. Ranchers also have the option
to sell to non-signatories.
Gibbs et al. (2016) analyse slaughterhouse purchases before and after zero‐deforestation
cattle agreements signed by major meatpacking companies. They found that
slaughterhouses responded positively by avoiding purchasing from properties with
deforestation. And that supplying properties had reduced deforestation.

Policy and law enforcement
Brazil’s legal system is known to be slow and allows for successive appeals so that those
with money for legal protection can easily avoid prosecution (Carvalho et al., 2019). Assessment
of sanctions in Mato Grosso State finds they play an important role in slowing deforestation but
measures to improve the collection of fines are urgently needed (Sousa, 2016). Fine
imposition was found to be negatively correlated with deforestation and embargoes were highly
effective. A study assessing field-based forest law enforcement found they had not been
universally effective but highly cost-effective on average (Börner et al., 2015). Another study
estimates that only 24 percent of those detected as not complying with the Forest Code receive
fines (Schmitt, 2015). And due to staffing and administrative problems, of those receiving fines
between only between 0.2 and 5 percent of fines are paid. Enforcing fines would produce large
amounts of funds which could be spent on environmental conservation and restoration (Carvalho
et al., 2019).
In 2008, there was a policy change2 which meant that those with unpaid environmental fines
could not access subsidised financing from the government (Carvalho et al., 2019). This
had a stronger impact than the fines themselves which can be appealed repeatedly and are often
not followed through (Fearnside, 2017). In the same year, a “blacklist” system was initiated to
penalise states with high illegal deforestation making it difficult for them to obtain deforestation
licenses (Carvalho et al., 2019).
Fearnside (2017, p8) notes “The strength of governance measures varies with election
cycles, and there is a tendency to relax enforcement of environmental regulations prior to
major elections, producing a significant relation between deforestation rates and elections”.

Land law
Brazil’s Constitution recognises the rights of Indigenous peoples to the lands have
traditionally occupied and which they live on permanently (Acebes et al., 2019). The federal
government is entrusted with the obligation to protect indigenous lands.
A new law passed in 2017 granted amnesty to those who illegally occupied land and
allows land grabbers to purchase public lands below market prices. Brito et al (2019)
assess the impact of this law on land grabbing finding loss of government revenue ranging
between 5 to 8 billion USD in the short-term. Long-term estimates show a risk of between

2
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Resolution from the Brazilian Central Bank BACEN 3545/2008

1.1 and 1.6 million hectares being deforested as a result, equivalent to 4.5-6.5 megatonnes of
CO2 emissions.
Probst et al (2020) analyse a large-scale land-titling programme called Terra Legal finding
evidence that small and medium land holders actually increased deforestation as land is
more profitable for cattle and crops.

Recommendations
Federal and state governments are responsible for creating (or maintaining the existence of)
effective police operations specialised in environmental crimes (Acebes et al., 2019). This
requires allocation of adequate funds for human resources. Police backup is needed for
inspectors. Nellemann (2012) recommends increasing national law enforcement capacities
through an INTERPOL based training scheme and support in forming national taskforces.
The Minister of Justice should convene all federal and state law enforcement authorities with
meaningful input from civil society organisations and indigenous peoples (Acebes et al., 2019).
There needs to be federal tracking of cases of violence and federalisation of cases of violence
that go without investigation. A group of federal (and state) prosecutors specialised in rural
violence and deforestation should be supported and enforcement systems integrated to avoid
producers from one state selling in another (Carvalho et al., 2019). All federal services need
more staff and resources (Acebes et al., 2019; Carvalho et al., 2019). All prosecutors failing
to uphold their duty should be held accountable with impartial investigations into their
dealings with criminal networks.
The administration must give messages of support and stop verbal attacks on NGOs. They
have the power to maintain, expand and protect the Amazon rainforest (Acebes et al., 2019).
The Ministry of Environment must guarantee inspector autonomy to impose fines and reestablish the Department of Forests and Combatting Deforestation. They need to enrol additional
human resources to speed up administrative processes (Acebes et al., 2019).
Issuing of permits should be centralised nationally to avoid trade being moved from illegal to
legal regions (Nellemann, 2012).
Complementary strategies must be developed to combat illegal deforestation in agrarian reform
settlements and undesignated public lands (Acebes et al., 2019). Since 2010, an estimated
two-thirds of the Amazon’s deforested area lies within public lands, primarily in agrarian reform
settlements (30%) and in undesignated areas (25%). Combating illegal deforestation should
therefore be aligned with the development and implementation of other public policies, especially
those that promote land regularisation. This is particularly relevant to the Brazilian Amazon,
due to its long history of irregular occupation. Effective and correct implementation of the
CAR is needed to avoid irregular occupation and land grabbing (Carvalho et al., 2019).
Land-tenure establishment based on deforestation must not continue (Fearnside, 2018). Land
speculation causes deforestation that has no benefits for the country.
Tax fraud investigations should focus on plantations and sawmills either laundering timber or
mis-reporting volumes (Nellemann, 2012).
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7. Violence
Between 2010 and 2020 an estimated 300 people have died in conflicts over land use and
resources in the Brazilian Amazonian states according to the Pastoral Land Commission
(Acebes et al., 2019). Reports from community forest patrollers highlights danger and threats.
Violence and intimidation are also used by land grabbers and loggers to deter officials from
upholding the law. A Human Rights Watch report (Acebes et al., 2019) documents the killing of
28 people, the attempted killing of 4, and more than 40 death threats though interviews with
many stakeholders. The majority of the incidences recorded were after 2015. Violence against
agency enforcement in Brazil include burning of bridges, destruction of a fuel truck for
helicopters, setting vehicles on fire and felling trees to obstruct roads. These acts are rarely
prosecuted.
There is systematic failure to investigate and prosecute threats and experienced violence
(Acebes et al., 2019). The authorities claim that the remote locations of these incidents make
them difficult to investigate and that there are not resources to travel to these areas, including
human resources and all-terrain vehicles. Reports from the Human Rights Watch interviews
suggests there may be some discrimination against indigenous groups or that local police
may be involved with the illegal activities. Criminal organisations hold political power. Brazil
has a Program to Protect Defenders of Human Rights, Journalists, and Environmentalists
which had 410 people receiving protection, of which 70 percent are defenders of indigenous
rights and the environment. The protection, albeit perceived to be weak, does provide some
recognition of the problem and accountability for continued actions.

Fires
Between January and August in 2019 satellites detected 46,000 locations in the Amazon with
active forest fires, more than twice the amount from the same period the previous year
(Acebes et al., 2019). In August, smoke from Brazil and neighbouring countries reached the
city of São Paulo enough to cover this in darkness. It is believed that fires may be
contributing to respiratory diseases. And gases and particles released are harmful particularly to
children.
“The attorney general said there is evidence the fires were the result of an “orchestrated
action” prepared in advance. The Pará state government said criminal groups had planned to
deforest, burn, and raise cattle in a 200 square kilometre area in a conservation reserve.”
(Acebes et al., 2019, p142).

8. Involving indigenous communities in combatting
deforestation
Indigenous people and local communities have an important role to play in identifying
logging which is avoiding satellite detection in the Brazilian Amazon (Acebes et al., 2019).
It is not possible to employ enforcement officers to cover such a large area and local
communities are less likely to be corrupted. Illegal deforestation has been found to be 250
percent less likely in indigenous areas possibly due to local community enforcement (Ding et al.,
2016).
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In the state of Maranhão, Brazil, lack of resources and staffing are identified for
enforcement agencies to carry out their job (Acebes et al., 2019). Here, indigenous peoples
have formed patrols known as ‘Forest Guardians’, groups of around 15 who identify sites and
provide authorities with names. In the Caru Indigenous Territory members of a women’s group
are learning to use drones to detect deforestation. Some of them also go on patrol with men.
There are examples of successful collaboration between these groups and the police. There are
also examples where the authorities fail to, or are unable to, respond. The patrols sometimes
detain loggers or their vehicles themselves which is legal though burning the vehicles is not.
They are aware that patrolling is a risk but feel they have no choice. Other indigenous peoples
carry out similar activities though the case of the Forest Guardians is a particularly well organised
example.
“Brazil’s duty to protect forest defenders and others from acts of violence and intimidation by
criminal groups involved in illegal logging — and bring perpetrators of these acts to justice — is
part of its obligations under international human rights law.” (Acebes et al., 2019, p??). The
relevant law is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).3
Property rights can help to secure support from indigenous communities. Baragwanath & Bayi
(2020) test satellite data from between 1982 and 2016 to assess the causal effect between
indigenous property rights and reduced deforestation. They find significantly less deforestation
inside a territory with full property rights than in areas right outside the border.

Recommendations
Forest defenders should be funded, equipped and trained. The Federal Programme to
Protect Human Rights Defenders in Brazil needs improved procedures and staff training
for risk analysis (Acebes et al., 2019). Protection plans for forest defenders should include:
electricity (solar panels or other means) for remote internet communication, security cameras in
homes, transportation expenses so that defenders are less isolated, and funding for legal
representation so they may pursue complaints against assailants. Forest defenders need to be
ensured confidentiality with information they share.
The Escazú regional agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice
in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean adopted needs to be ratified
so that states guarantee an enabling environment for the protection of forest defenders (Acebes
et al., 2019).

9. International agreements and action
Laws and agreements
It was beyond the scope of this report to detail all of the certification schemes and programmes
which have evolved to reduce illegal logging. These schemes include voluntary trade
agreements such as the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT)

3

https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx Accessed 4.12.20
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Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs), or Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)
certification (Nellemann, 2012). They have been useful in bringing stakeholders together and
generating incentives for legal exports and more sustainable forestry.
The Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazon4
(PPCDAm), launched in 2004, is one of the most important regional agreements (Nelleman,
2012). It aims to reduce deforestation rates continuously alongside transition towards a
sustainable development model in the region.

International trade
The Brazilian government created agreements so that goods produced comply with forest
protection including the Terms of Adjustment of Conduct (TAC) for meatpacking
companies in 2009 and the Soy Moratorium in 2006 (Lujan, 2018). The Soy Moratorium
aimed at stopping the main soy purchasers from buying beans produced in illegally
deforested areas. However, laundering can occur when soy is commercialised as if it were
produced in legal areas or in the names of people who serve as fronts for illegal activities
(Carvalho et al., 2019). And leakage can occur for example when farmers grow soy in legal areas
that were being used to graze cattle and then deforest other areas to move the cattle to.
The TAC aimed to bar the sale of cattle that had been reared on or produced in illegal land
(Carvalho et al., 2019). Ranchers find ways around the agreement by, for example, registering
only the parts of their land that are legally deforested or selling cattle to those with legal land who
act as middlemen. Only half of meatpackers have signed the agreement and there is little market
pressure, particularly from the increasingly important Chinese market. And there was no
punishment for those that produced cattle illegal areas.
The European Union are critical of the Brazilian government response to illegal deforestation
which is hampering trade agreement decisions (Rajão et al., 2020). The Brazilian Government
state that international conservation laws are upheld.
Recommendations
Importers must make increased efforts to ensure that timber, cattle, meat, or agricultural
products purchased in Brazil did not originate in illegally deforested or illegally occupied
areas in the Amazon. Companies need to disclose their procedures and the origins of their
products (Acebes et al, 2019).
Increased transparency is required in global supply chains with better labelling (Carvalho et al.,
2019). Initiatives such as Transparency for Sustainable Economics (Trase)5 are working on
getting information on supply chain transparency out in the public domain and should be

4

http://redd.mma.gov.br/en/legal-and-public-policyframework/ppcdam#:~:text=The%20Action%20Plan%20for%20the,development%20model%20in%20the%20regi
on Accessed 7.12.20
5

https://trase.earth/ accessed 2.12.20
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supported. Trase use publicly available data to show linking between commodity exports and
agricultural conditions.
Nellemann (2012) recommends an international rating system of companies to reduce investor
attractiveness to those using illegal practices.

International action
Ethical investment is an important area for international influence. Large investments are
required to enable illegal timber laundering which come from Asia, EU and the US including
investments through pension funds (Nellemann, 2012). Both domestic and international financial
institutions have a role to play, including banks, insurance companies and pension funds. Van
Gelder and Kuepper (2020) assessed the policies and actions of Dutch financial institutions for
association with deforestation-risk companies. They found 6 out of 7 banks, 5 out of 9 insurance
companies and 10 out of 10 pension funds to have relationships with these companies. Four of
the banks provided loans to the deforestation-risk companies. Four financial institutions
demonstrated steps taken to prevent involvement in deforestation. All companies should be
rated on the likelihood of their involvement in illegal logging to discourage stock markets
and investors from funding them (Nellemann, 2012). Financial institutions need to commit to
zero tolerance, set clear and strict policy criteria, be transparent, communicate expectations,
screen and exclude offenders, and continually monitor (Van Gelder and Kuepper, 2020).
Norway have withdrawn some funding for actions to prevent deforestation which was
conditional on deforestation rates improving and have threatened to withdraw more if rates
do not improve (Carvalho et al., 2019).
Ecosystem services such as maintaining biodiversity, recycling water, and storing carbon to
support global warming reduction need to be assigned value payments internationally
(Carvalho et al., 2019). These costs of deforestation are higher than profits to be made however,
there are difficulties in calculating such values.
Nellemann (2012) suggests that investigation of tax fraud, corruption and laundering should be
prioritised and supported by national task forces working with INTERPOL. The International
Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime6 (ICCWC) is a collaboration of five
intergovernmental organisations7 to support wildlife law enforcement. It provides a
substantial commitment to sharing and coordinating international efforts. It represents the chain
of customs, police and justice. It also addresses anti-money laundering. “The cost of
implementing an effective international law enforcement scheme and training capacity to
substantially reduce the emissions from illegal logging is estimated to be approximately US$ 20–
30 million dollars annually” (Nellemann, 2012, p8).

6

https://cites.org/eng/prog/iccwc_new.php Accessed 7.12.20

7

CITES Secretariat, INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Bank and
the World Customs organization (WCO)
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